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Abstract 
 
We study the dynamics of U.S. public debt in a parsimonious VAR. We find that 
including debt feedback ensures the stationarity of debt while standard VARs excluding 
debt may imply an explosive debt path. We also find that the response of debt to inflation 
or interest shocks is not robust and depends on the policy regime. The recent past 
suggests that a positive shock to inflation increases debt while the same to interest rate 
decreases it. Positive shocks to growth and primary surplus unambiguously reduce debt.   
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I. Introduction 
The 2008 global financial crisis has resulted in large deficits and public debt burdens 
across many countries. IMF (2009) projections indicate that the level of public debt for 
advanced countries would reach over 100 percent of GDP by 2014, a level unseen since 
the Second World War. For the United States, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimates that although the federal deficit would decline from 9.9 percent of GDP in 2009 
to 2.6 percent in 2014, federal public debt would rise to 66 percent of GDP from 53 
percent in 2009.1  
 
As the US emerges from the crisis and returns to “normal” times, there would be a 
growing need to scale down large budget deficit and debt burden. Would debt start 
declining in the future? How do major macroeconomic aggregates such as growth, 
inflation, interest rate, and fiscal deficit affect debt dynamics? How should debt be 
reduced? To study the relationship between public debt and macroeconomic variables, we 
suggest a modified VAR framework in the tradition of Sims (1980) that includes a debt 
feedback equation as in Favero and Giavazzi (2007, 2009). Basically, the VAR model 
includes the debt to GDP ratio (and its lags) that is governed by a separate deterministic 
debt equation. We use the generalized impulse responses method of Koop, Pesaran, and 
Potter (1996) to analyze variable dynamics in reaction to shocks.  
 
The framework outlined in this paper is parsimonious, yet important to use in the debt 
and fiscal policy analysis. Favero and Giavazzi (2007, 2009) argued for the importance of 
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 The CBO projections are April 2010 forecast. 
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using the debt feedback equation since excluding debt in the VAR had resulted in 
misspecification. They analyzed the effects of expenditure and revenue shocks on growth 
using a narrative approach of Romer and Romer (2010) and a structural approach of 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Our emphasis is, however, on public debt dynamics.2 In 
general, impulse responses of main macroeconomic aggregates are not substantially 
altered by excluding debt feedback as shown by Favero and Giavazzi (2007, 2009). 
However, we show that both out-of-sample debt forecasts and debt impulse responses can 
substantially differ.  
 
We show that the linear approximation of debt to GDP implicit in typical VARs may be 
misleading and may produce an explosive debt path and different impulse responses of 
debt to shocks. If the underlying debt dynamics are not on a stable path, the estimated 
effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates may no longer be meaningful. It 
would be unreasonable to assume that an economy can sustain an unbounded level of 
debt. We thus add another angle to the misspecification problem discussed in Favero and 
Giavazzi (2007, 2009). Lastly, we use generalized impulse responses to deal with the 
history and shock dependence inherent to nonlinear models. The inclusion of debt to 
GDP in the VAR implies a nonlinear relationship among variables. Therefore, the use of 
generalized impulse responses provides a natural way to examine out-of-sample forecasts 
and impulse responses that are conditional expectations based on history and shocks. 
 
                                                 
2
 Fiscal revenue and expenditure do not appear explicitly in our VAR since we use primary balance. 
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Using the US data and different time periods, our findings are as follows. First, the post-
1980 sample suggests that excluding the debt feedback in the VAR results in explosive 
debt dynamics and persistent debt impulse responses. Second, as compared to growth and 
primary deficit shocks, the response of public debt to monetary policy related variables, 
inflation and interest rate can be positive or negative depending upon the policy regime. 
The recent past suggests that a positive shock to inflation increases debt while higher 
growth, primary surplus, and interest rate lower debt. The empirical evidence indicates 
that the effect of higher inflation on debt will largely depend on the policy regime in 
place. If monetary and fiscal policy reacted to higher inflation as observed in post-1980, 
the inflation effect would actually be self-defeating as debt would rise. Lastly, the debt 
ratio is forecast to peak at about 70 percent of GDP by 2015 and gradually decrease 
thereafter. 
 
Two recent papers by Hall and Sargent (2010) and Aizenman and Marion (2009) explore 
the role of inflation in reducing debt. Hall and Sargent (2010) show that about 23 percent 
of the debt reduction from 1945 to 1974 was due to inflation. Yet they indicate that the 
average maturity of public debt has shortened to about three years from seven in the 
aftermath of WWII, thus reducing the benefit of inflation in reducing the debt. Aizenman 
and Marion (2009) point out that although the maturity of debt is shorter now, a higher 
proportion of debt held by foreigners creates an incentive to inflate. They find that an 
inflation of 6 percent could reduce the debt to GDP ratio by about 20 percent over 4 
years. Yet the authors caution that the result depends on model parameters, especially the 
parameter on the cost of inflation, and that modest inflation may result in unintended 
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consequences of inflation acceleration. Our findings show that the response of debt to a 
positive inflation shock is not robust across samples, and the dynamics observed post-
1980 would generate higher debt after several quarters. It is mostly driven by higher 
interest rate. 
 
A few papers incorporate public debt in VAR estimations. However, for the most part 
they test for the sustainability of debt, examine fiscal policy effects, or study other 
countries than the U.S., and more importantly, they do not study debt impulse responses. 
Further, these papers either use one lag of debt in VAR (Afonso and Sousa, 2009) that 
may result in misspecification, use public debt as one of the endogenous variables 
(Hasko, 2007, and Corsetti, Meier, and Muller, 2009), or use long-term cointegration 
approach (Boisinnot, L’Angevin, and Monfort, 2004, and Polito and Wickens, 2007). 
Chung and Leeper (2007) use VAR with cross-equation restrictions arising from the 
present-value condition of debt sustainability. Barro (1980) studied the effect of US 
public debt shocks on output and unemployment using regressions without VAR 
dynamics. Bohn (1998) in a single regression, incorporating the tax smoothing model of 
Barro (1979), showed that US public debt was stationary as primary surplus reacted to 
higher levels of debt. Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry (2007) simulate debt paths for 
emerging countries based on an estimated fiscal reaction function in a panel and country 
specific VARs of other macroeconomic variables excluding debt feedback.3 Many others 
have used cross-country data (e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010).   
 
                                                 
3
 See Celasun and Keim (2010) for an application to the U.S.  
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The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents methodology and data. Section III 
is the main section of the paper analyzing debt dynamics. Section IV concludes. 
 
II. Empirical Model, Estimation, and Data 
A. Empirical Model 
To keep the model parsimonious, VAR is based on the following four variables in the 
endogenous vector Y  specified in equation (1): primary balance to GDP ratio (primary 
expenditures minus revenues, pb ), real growth rate ( g ), inflation rate based on the GDP 
deflator ( ), and nominal average interest rate based on interest payments on debt ( i ). 
The variables used are those that enter equation (2) describing debt dynamics. The VAR 
specification also includes the debt to GDP ratio ( d ): 
t
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Equations (1)-(2) define our system of equations.  
 
B. Estimation and Impulse Responses 
The model estimation is straightforward, but the computation of impulse responses (IRs) 
requires keeping track of the debt feedback in equation (1). VAR is estimated using OLS. 
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 We ignore the debt residual, including non-deficit financing, in our specification. For the US, the debt 
residual has not been large historically as shown in Favero and Giavazzi (2007). 
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Similarly to Favero and Giavazzi (2007), we find that it is the change in debt that affects 
VAR dynamics as coefficients on lagged debt are close in absolute value but of the 
opposite signs. Since equation (2) includes all the estimated variables in (1) and has no 
parameters, it does not need any estimation. The impulse response is the difference 
between projections based on equations (1) and (2) with and without a shock (a “shock” 
path and baseline, respectively).5  
 
In this paper, we follow Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) in computing generalized 
impulse responses (GIRs) that allow us to bypass the problem of ordering dependence in 
the Cholesky normalization and to incorporate nonlinearities. We study conditional 
expectations of our variables to shocks generated from the observed relationships. In 
essence, a shock in this framework is an innovation to the variable together with 
innovations to other variables that one would expect given sample correlations among 
innovations. It amounts to ordering the variable first each time it is “shocked.” Koop, 
Pesaran, and Potter (1996) show that nonlinearities introduce shock and history 
dependence, which may make the interpretation of traditional IRs difficult. The computed 
GIRs are defined as the difference between the expectations conditional on history ( w ) 
and a shock ( v ) for the response and on history ( w ) for the baseline: 
,....2,1,0)|(),|(),,;( 111   nforwYEwvYEnwvYGIR tntttnttt             (3) 
Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) describe in detail how to compute GIRs. We use a 
simple bootstrapping procedure and an estimated variance-covariance matrix of residuals 
                                                 
5
 See Favero and Giavazzi (2007, 2009) for a similar treatment. 
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in equation (1) to generate shocks and derive GIRs based on (3).6 We condition the 
calculation of GIRs on the last observations in the sample, 1tw . 
 
C. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used are quarterly series and are available from several sources. Total revenues, 
expenditures, and interest payments (seasonally adjusted) are taken from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’s National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA, Table 3.2). 
Nominal and real GDP and GDP deflator series come from the same source. The 
quarterly data are available from 1947. Federal debt held by public is taken from St. 
Louis’s Federal Reserve, FRED database. The quarterly debt series are available from 
1970 while the annual data start earlier. We use equation (2) for debt dynamics to impute 
quarterly values between the adjacent annual figures. Our whole sample covers the period 
from the second quarter of 1947 to the first quarter of 2009. Given a structural break 
occurring at about 1980 as shown in Perotti (2004), first we present our results based on 
the post-1980 sample. We also perform robustness checks and discuss the implications. 
 
The debt ratio as a percent of GDP had both downward and upward trends in the latter 
part of the 20
th
 century (Figure 1). The debt level stood at about 90 percent of GDP after 
World War II but steadily declined afterward to the mid-20s range by the late 1970s. 
Debt doubled in the 1980s to about 50 percent of GDP and decreased to its mean level of 
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 We also used Monte Carlo normal sampling, and the results were similar. 
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about 40 percent of GDP in the 1990s (Table 1). Another debt buildup has been occurring 
since late 2008.  
 
The sample after 1980 clearly shows less volatility and a switch in sign in correlations of 
monetary policy related variables, interest rate and inflation, with primary balance and 
growth (Tables 1 and 2). All variables in the model except for primary balance show 
lower standard deviation in the 1980-2009 period than in the earlier sample. Average 
inflation is lower while the average interest rate is higher after 1980 reflecting most likely 
tighter monetary policy. Average growth is lower. In the post-1980 sample, higher deficit 
is associated with lower interest rate but higher inflation, while the interest rate and 
growth are positively correlated. The opposite relationships are observed before 1980. 
Both subsamples show that higher deficit is associated with lower growth and lower debt. 
The interest rate and inflation also correlate negatively with debt. These correlations 
show some interesting patterns in the data, and we examine the dynamics of these 
variables in the following section. 
 
III. Debt Dynamics 
The debt feedback dynamics keep the debt level in check. The debt ratio is projected to 
peak at about 70 percent of GDP (starting from the second quarter of 2009) by 2014-2015 
and slowly decline afterward. 
 
To assess policies and explore the effects of macroeconomic aggregates on debt, we 
compute debt impulse responses. We find that the effects of primary balance and growth 
10 
are large and robust while those of inflation and interest rate are smaller and depend on 
the sample used. Fiscal policy and growth are the main ingredients in the fiscal 
adjustment process. 
 
A. Stationarity of Debt and Out-of-Sample Forecast 
The debt feedback in the model ensures sustainable debt dynamics. It is evident that 
without the debt feedback, debt grows beyond 130-140 percent of GDP in ten years 
(Figure 2). The results are similar irrespective of whether only the debt feedback part is 
shut down or whether the debt path is computed based on VAR without debt in the model 
(the implicit linear approximation). In fact, even debt impulse responses largely differ, 
especially at longer horizons, depending upon whether the debt feedback is accounted 
for, shut down, or not included in VAR (Figure 3). 
 
In addition to assessing the reaction of debt to various shocks, policymakers may also 
want to know how debt would evolve in the near future given the current history and/or 
shocks. The out-of-sample forecast renders naturally to our framework. Based on the 
latest observation in the sample, we project debt from the second quarter of 2009 for the 
next ten years (Figure 2). Although debt grows initially to about 70 percent of GDP in the 
next five years, it starts declining afterward as growth picks up and deficit falls. At the 
end of the projection period, however, it still stays well above the current level of debt. 
Our forecast is similar to that of CBO. 
 
B. Debt Impulse Responses 
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The effects of primary balance and growth on debt dynamics are large while those of 
inflation and interest rates are relatively small. A positive shock to the primary balance 
(higher deficit in this paper’s definition) of one standard deviation increases debt by 
about 1.5 percent of GDP in about 2.5 years (Figure 4). A one standard deviation positive 
shock to growth lowers debt by about 1 percent of GDP in the same timeframe. In 
contrast, a positive inflation shock in fact increases debt after several quarters while a 
shock to the interest rate does not affect debt much in the first few years (Figure 4). 
 
To explain these results, we show a decomposition of debt IRs. The primary balance, on 
one hand, and the nonlinear component (comprised of the interest rate, growth, and 
inflation multiplied by the previous debt stock, see equation [2]), on the other hand, drive 
the dynamics. We approximate the nonlinear component by its linear representation (see 
Figure 4 and Appendix B for details). 
 
Following a shock to the primary balance, the effect on debt is not surprising. Most of the 
change is driven by the primary balance and less so by the interest rate, growth, and 
inflation. Interestingly, a similar pattern emerges for a growth shock although initially the 
growth effect is relatively large. Running primary surpluses accounts for most of the 
decline in debt. 
 
In the case of inflation and interest rate shocks, a change in debt is driven by much higher 
interest rate. Even though the primary balance is in surplus, it is not enough to 
compensate for a large increase in the interest rate. Growth does not contribute positively 
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in the initial periods, either. Debt increases after the inflation shock until it starts 
declining as growth and primary surplus continue to improve. In the case of the interest 
rate shock, debt slowly declines as high primary surplus and improving growth outweigh 
the increasing interest rate.  
 
C. Robustness of Debt Impulse Responses 
The importance of including the debt feedback in VAR becomes apparent as sample 
periods vary. Similar to the 1980-2009 sample, the 1947-1979 sample produces the ever-
increasing debt dynamics in VAR without the debt feedback (Figure 5). The debt impulse 
responses produce different dynamics as well (Figure 6). The whole sample (1947-2009) 
and the 1973-2009 sample (from the onset of flexible exchange rates), however, indicate 
that the debt path is not explosive (Appendix Figures A1 and A2). The linear 
approximation to debt in VAR works only in a subset of samples. In contrast, VAR with 
the debt feedback produces a robust result that debt dynamics are not explosive in each 
subsample. 
 
Using other sample periods, we find that the interest rate and inflation effects on debt are 
not robust. The 1947-1979 sample similarly shows that it takes a few quarters for debt to 
increase following a positive inflation shock and debt does not increase following an 
interest rate shock (Figure 7). In contrast, the 1973-2009 sample shows that debt falls 
after an inflation shock while it rises after an interest rate shock (Appendix Figure A3). 
The whole 1947-2009 sample indicates that following an inflation or interest rate shock, 
debt initially falls, and after about 3 years it starts rising (Appendix Figure A4). We note 
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that the contribution of inflation to debt dynamics was much stronger before 1980 than 
post-1980, indicating most likely a tighter and more independent monetary policy regime. 
The contribution of primary balance to debt dynamics following an inflation shock has 
also changed directions across samples, for instance, pushing debt levels higher in the 
pre-1980 period. These results indicate that higher inflation may not always be a way to 
lower debt. The policy regime is therefore important. 
 
The effects of deficit and growth shocks are in the same direction across subsamples but 
their magnitudes differ. The 1947-1979 and 1947-2009 samples indicate a much smaller 
effect of deficit and growth shocks on debt. The 1973-2009 sample shows a stronger 
impact similar to the post-1980 period.  
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Using the modified VAR with the debt feedback and generalized impulse responses, we 
assess the dynamics of US public debt in relation to major macroeconomic aggregates. 
We argue that it is important to incorporate the debt feedback in VAR models as a debt 
path may not be stable and impulse responses become very persistent. We find that fiscal 
policy and growth have strong effects on debt while monetary policy related variables 
such as interest rate and inflation have relatively small impact and are not robust. The 
policy regime in place will affect the response of debt to, for instance, higher inflation. 
Our findings suggest that if the Fed reacts as it did in the recent past, a positive inflation 
shock (say, an imported inflation shock) would in fact increase debt. Finally, this time 
should not be any different if policymakers and economic agents respond to the debt 
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buildup as in the past. Reaching 70 percent of GDP in 4-5 years, the debt ratio is forecast 
to gradually fall afterward. 
 
Our paper hints at a potential misspecification of standard VARs that include fiscal 
variables. The simulation of such models could produce stationary paths for the variables 
explicitly included. Yet, an important but implied variable such as a stock of debt could 
be building up in an unreasonable fashion in the background. If it is the case, the original 
model without debt may not be a valid way to study the relationships among variables. 
Thus, one needs to keep in mind possible implications of the original model and include 
debt feedback as this paper illustrates. 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
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Figure 1. Evolution of Public Debt (1947:II-2009:I) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Sh
ar
e
 o
f G
D
P
20 
Figure 2. Debt: Out-of-Sample Forecast (1980-2009) 
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Figure 3. Debt Impulse Responses: A Comparison of VAR Models (1980-2009) 
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Figure 4. Debt Impulse Responses and Decomposition (1980-2009) 
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Figure 5. Debt: Out-of-Sample Forecast (1947-1979) 
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Figure 6. Debt Impulse Responses: A Comparison of VAR Models (1947-1979) 
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Figure 7. Debt Impulse Responses and Decomposition (1947-1979) 
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Appendix A 
 
Figure A1. Debt: Out-of-Sample Forecast (1947-2009) 
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Figure A2. Debt: Out-of-Sample Forecast (1973-2009) 
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Figure A3. Debt Impulse Responses and Decomposition (1973-2009) 
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Figure A4. Debt Impulse Response and Decomposition (1947-2009) 
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Appendix B 
We define the decomposition of the debt impulse response, IRd , in terms of the contribution 
of each macroeconomic aggregate as follows: 
****
tttt
n
t
s
t
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t igpbddd   , 
where s  and n  stand for “shock” and “no shock” debt paths. Using debt dynamics equation 
(2) in the text and approximating the nonlinear component, the components of the 
decomposition at time t  are: 
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The first term in each equation indicates the difference between “shock” and “no shock” 
paths of the components scaled by the previous “no shock” debt ratio. The second term is the 
adjusted previous value of the component. Thus, the debt impulse response decomposition is: 
    IRtstststnttnstnstnstnsIRt dgidigpbd 11//// 1    , 
where ns /  stands for the difference between “shock” and “no shock” paths. Note also that 
the last term disappears in the initial period, 1t , as the previous (before shock, 0t ), debt 
ratio is same. 
 
